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 1 
The Future of Education for All as a Global 
Regime of Educational Governance1 
 
Abstract 
The article critically considers the future of Education for All (EFA) understood as a global 
regime of educational governance. The article sets out an understanding of global 
governance, world order, power and legitimacy within which EFA is embedded. It explains 
what is meant by EFA as a regime of global governance and as part of a ‘regime complex’ 
along with other regimes concerned with different areas of economic and social 
development that impact on education and development. The article traces the genealogy 
of EFA focusing on the development of key tensions and contradictions since the late 1980s. 
Here the emphasis will be on understanding the effects of different kinds of power that are 
in turn linked to broader global interests within a changing world order. The article 
concludes by considering the future of EFA. It is suggested that EFA since the adoption of 
the Incheon declaration and Framework for Action is giving way to a new global regime of 
educational governance in which education and in particular learning is linked to sustainable 
development, albeit in contradictory ways.  
Introduction 
The first aim of the article is to consider the future of Education for All (EFA) as a global 
regime of educational governance. The article will commence by setting out the underlying 
view of global governance. Central to this view is a consideration of the effects of different 
kinds of power that are linked to global interests and struggles for hegemony within a 
changing world order. In particular the article draws on Barnett and Duvall’s (Barnett and 
Duvall 2004b; Barnett and Duvall 2005) typology of power in international relations and 
politics. The second aim, related to the first is to consider the future of EFA through drawing 
on insights from regime theory, i.e. to develop an understanding of EFA as a global regime 
of educational governance. It will be argued that understanding EFA in this way allows for a 
consideration of the distinctive but changing nature of the principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures that have shaped the issue area of education and development 
since the late 1980s. It also allows for a consideration of the relative power of different 
discourses, governments, non-governmental organisations and networks in shaping EFA. It 
will also be argued, however, that EFA needs to be understood as part of a 'regime complex' 
that includes other global regimes governing different areas of economic and social 
development that have impacted on education and development in sometimes 
                                                     
1 A first version of this paper was presented to the United Kingdom Forum for Education and 
Training (UKFIET) conference, 15-17 September, 2015, Examination’s School, Oxford. I 
would like to acknowledge the critical feedback given to earlier drafts by the journal 
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 2 
contradictory ways. Considering EFA as a global regime allows for a consideration of the 
relative influence of different regimes with implications for future change. 
 
The article will then set out the genealogy of EFA, focusing on the development of key 
tensions and contradictions both within EFA and between EFA and other regimes that arise 
from the effects of different forms of power. The article concludes by considering the 
possible future of EFA. It is suggested that since the adoption of the Incheon Declaration 
and Framework for Action EFA is giving way to a new regime characterised by a modified set 
of norms and principles related to the role of education, or more specifically learning in 
relation to sustainable development. The article is intended to be conceptual and 
exploratory in nature. At a methodological level, analysis is based on an abductive process 
of reasoning in which the existing literature on EFA has been re-interpreted against both 
Barnett and Duvall’s typology of power and insights from regime theory. 2 Rather than 
seeking to provide a definitive account, the article is intended to provoke debate about the 
global governance of education and development and to provide a basis for further 
research.  
Understanding of global governance 
There exist several detailed accounts of how global governance is conceptualized within the 
field of international relations and how different theories of global governance have been 
applied within the field of international and comparative education (Phillip W Jones 2007b; 
Coleman and Jones 2004; Mundy and Manion 2014). The current analysis will seek to build 
on this rich scholarship through considering EFA from the point of view of recent 
developments in the understanding of global governance. In particular, the article will 
attempt to understand global governance in relation to the working of different kinds of 
power (Barnett and Duvall 2005; Barnett and Duvall 2004a) and as a  regime of global 
governance operating within a regime complex (Orsini, Morin, and Young 2013; Barnett and 
Walker 2015; Young 2012; Hook and Rumsey 2015; Drezner 2009; Keohane and Victor 2011; 
Alter and Meunier 2009). In so doing the article will seek to bring together a liberal 
institutionalist concern with the nature of regimes and the role of regimes in developing 
consensus around a common set of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures 
in a particular issue area with a more critical concern with the power dynamics within 
regimes and how regimes are shaped and in turn influence power relationships within the 
wider field of global governance. As Jones (Phillip W Jones 2007b) has suggested, one way 
of achieving such a rapprochement is to conceive of regimes and regime complexes in 
Gramscian terms, i.e. as global institutions that are fundamentally concerned with achieving 
consent for the institutions and laws of global governance as a basis for maintaining 
hegemony within an anarchic world order. Central to this way of thinking is the issue of the 
legitimacy of global regimes in relation to the institutions and networks that are part of the 
regime and that are affected by the regime3. Maintaining the legitimacy of governance 
                                                     
2 Following Danermark et al (2002), the analysis has involved abductive reasoning, i.e. a process of interpreting 
and re-contextualizing individual phenomena within a conceptual framework or a set of ideas. In this case it is 
to understand the genealogy of EFA in relation to the working of different forms of power nad in relation to 
regime theory.  
3 Here I draw on Keohane’s (Keohane 2011) understanding of the legitimacy of international regimes as 
residing in their moral acceptability, inclusiveness, epistemic quality (by which he means integrity and 
transparency, accountability, compatibility with governance norms at a national level and be of perceived 
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within a particular issue area such as education and development in the face of tension and 
contradictions within and between regimes provides a key motive for powerful actors in 
shaping regimes and a basis for regime change. 
 
It is important to locate an understanding of regimes within a wider conceptualisation of 
global governance. Global governance is itself a contested concept. The view advanced here 
refers to the ‘political regulation of transboundary processes and actors’ (Stephen and 
Stephen 2014): 
 
Global governance in this understanding is a capacious concept, encompassing a plethora of 
public and private authorities affecting transnational processes, from the promulgation of 
private regulations and standards, transnational networks and civil society organizations, 
transnational policy planning forums, and international law, through to international 
‘regimes’ and the high tables of the United Nations organs (Stephen and Stephen 2014). 
 
In the context of contemporary globalization, global governance is understood in relation to 
a dominant ‘hegemonic bloc’ that represents a contradictory fusion of the politics of states 
and empire, i.e. the US and its allies and the interests of dominant factions of capital 
including transnational corporations and finance capital (Robert and Timothy 1996; Rupert 
2009; Harvey 2014; Harvey 2003; Tikly 2006a). It is a ‘liberal’ world order in the sense that it 
fosters a market-led view of human development. In these analyses, the spread of neo-
liberal orthodoxy instantiated in the so-called ‘Washington consensus’ during the 1980s 
reflected the dominance of Western powers and of representatives of global capital on the 
Boards of the major global financial institutions. The ‘liberal’ basis of world order has, 
however, shifted over time. This shift has been discussed at length elsewhere in relation to 
the field of international and comparative education (Robertson et al. 2007). In broad terms 
it has entailed a change in emphasis from a view of untrammeled market forces as the 
vehicle for delivering development that lay at the heart of the Washington consensus with a  
concern with a role for public private partnerships in eliminating poverty which formed the 
basis for the so-called ‘post-Washington consensus’ (Birdsall and Fukuyama 2011b; Birdsall 
and Fukuyama 2011a). More recently, and partly as a response to the global financial 
meltdown of 2008 what is beginning to emerge is a new underlying, hegemonic view of 
‘sustainable development’ encapsulated in the Sustainable Development Goals. This 
involves on the one hand an increasing concern with sustainable economic development on 
the part of the World Bank and global financial institutions, i.e. that economic growth must 
be environmentally sustainable, inclusive as well as contributing to poverty alleviation and 
on the other hand, with the view championed by the other key UN agencies and dating back 
to the Bruntland Report  of sustainable human development. As we will see, these two 
strands have potentially contradictory implications in issue areas such as education and 
development. 
 
In this view global governance is centrally concerned with managing crisis within the global 
capitalist economy, securing the basis for future accumulation and growth and legitimising 
dominant interests. The Washington and post-Washington consensuses and the more 
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recent shift to sustainable development can be seen as a response to crisis in the global 
economy in the interests of the dominant hegemonic bloc. Global governance is also 
contested. As we will see in relation to EFA, it is contested ‘from within’ by actors who share 
alternative views of the goals of human development including organisations and networks 
that comprise global civil society. Global Western hegemony is, however, also increasingly 
challenged by the emergence of new ‘Rising Powers’ including the so-called BRICS (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa) economies. The interests of these powers are realised 
on the one hand through negotiating international rules and terms to make them more 
compatible with their own more state-led development paths. This includes challenging the 
‘liberal’ basis of Western rule (Stephen and Stephen 2014). In this case, international 
agencies become the site for these contestations and a barometer for assessing the balance 
of power. It also involves developing their own bilateral relationships with other low-income 
and emerging economies to secure trade and access to natural resources. An aspect of this 
is the exertion of their own ‘soft power’ through bilateral development assistance (King 
2013; Bräutigam 2011).  
Power in global governance 
Whereas previous work has explored the discursive basis of global educational governance 
(Tikly 2006b), the spotlight of the present article falls on the political domain and 
particularly on the role of global institutions and an analysis of power. The paper is informed 
by the work of the international relations theorists Barnett and Duvall (Barnett and Duvall 
2005; Barnett and Duvall 2004a) which has been found particularly valuable in 
understanding the tensions at the heart of EFA. These scholars argue that much work on 
global governance has not included a sustained consideration of power and that ‘this is 
paradoxical because governance and power are inextricably linked. Governance involves the 
rules, structures, and institutions that guide, regulate, and control social life, features that 
are fundamental elements of power. To account for how global activities are guided and 
how world orders are produced, therefore, requires careful and explicit analysis of the 
workings of power’ (Barnett and Duvall 2004b). The authors define power as ‘the 
production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to 
determine their own circumstances and fate’ (Barnett and Duvall 2004b). They distinguish 
between different kinds of power that operate within the sphere of international relations. 
They are each relatively autonomous, linked to different global structures and causal 
mechanisms with different loci and have causes and effects at different levels and scales.4  
 
The four types of power fall within two broad categories. The first is concerned with the 
more observable forms of power that work through the interactions of specific actors. They 
define compulsory power as comprising the relations of interaction that allow one actor to 
have direct control over another. In the context of the present discussion this is most 
obvious it will be argued in the conditionalities that have been attached to aid. A second 
type of power is institutional in which states design international institutions in ways that 
work to their long-term advantage and to the disadvantage of others. In relation to the 
                                                     
4 There work can, therefore, be described as ‘critical realist’ in that it seeks to make use of conceptions of 
power associated with different theoretical traditions in international relations but to bring these together to 
develop a more holistic ontological view of power in global governance. (Note, here ‘realist’ does not refer to 
the realist theoretical tradition within international relations so much as to the philosophy of science outlined 
by Roy Bhaskar). 
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development of EFA it is manifest in the historical dominance of the interests of powerful, 
Western nations and private sector interests in the governance structures of global financial 
institutions such as the World Bank (Philip W Jones 2006; Phillip W Jones 2007b; Mundy and 
Verger 2015). Extending the concept of institutional power somewhat beyond Barnett and 
Duvall’s original conception, it is also possible to conceive of institutional power in terms of 
the degree of influence of different international organisations on the nature of a specific 
regime and in terms of the degree and direction of influence between different regimes. In 
relation to the former, the World Bank has proved particularly influential in shaping EFA as 
will be argued. In relation to the latter, it will be suggested that the Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG) regime has historically proved more powerful in mobilising 
resources for education than has the EFA regime. Changing patterns of dominance between 
regimes in a regime complex can be explained as the outcome of differences in institutional 
power held by coalitions of institutions in specific regimes. 
 
The second broad category relates to two forms that although less directly observable play a 
powerful role in constituting social relationships between actors. The first of these, 
structural power, concerns the constitution of social capacities and interests of actors in 
direct relation to one another. One expression of this form of power is the working of the 
global capitalist economy, in producing unequal social relations of production between 
capital and labour. Class relationships of dominance and subordination in international 
relationships also intersect in complex ways with those of gender, culture and race (e.g. 
Rupert 2009). Although less obvious to observe empirically in relation to the development 
of EFA, an understanding of structural power is nonetheless fundamental for understanding 
the nature of the wider political global economy against which the development of EFA 
must be understood.  
 
Finally, productive power is the socially diffused production of subjectivity in systems of 
meaning and signification including the way that ‘development’ itself is defined and 
understood. Here the understanding of productive power owes much to Foucault’s 
conception of governmentality, i.e. a consideration of how the art and rationality underlying 
particular forms of global governance and the political technologies through which these 
become realised have their own constitutive effects. As with structural power, the workings 
of productive power are less obvious than those of compulsory and institutional power but 
no less important for understanding how the identities of different actors are constituted 
and the policies of different institutions are discursively framed. In the sections below, it will 
be argued that the underlying view of education and development informing EFA has been 
informed by dominant economistic discourses on the one hand and by rights based 
discourses on the other. Specifically, they have been elaborated by overlapping but 
distinctive ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas 2001; Haas 1993; Haas 1989). The term epistemic 
community is used here to describe ‘the roles played by networks of experts in international 
decision-making: how they agree upon and articulate causal linkages within complex issue 
spaces; how they frame issues and define salient discourse; how they define and limit 
potential solutions or outcomes; and how they define state interests within the issue space’ 
(Brown 2015 251).5 Both of the discourses we consider are also primarily Western in nature 
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dominant actors for example, through the influence of specific disciplinary discourses such as mainstream 
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with their origins in the European enlightenment (de Sousa Santos 2012; de Sousa Santos 
1999; Escobar 2014; Tikly 2006b) and this it will be suggested has implications for the future 
legitimacy of EFA as a global regime. Importantly for our analysis the different forms of 
power do not operate in isolation from each other but intersect. As we will see they come 
together in complex ways to shape the nature of global regimes such as EFA.  
 
Characterising EFA as a global regime of educational governance 
Global governance also needs to be understood at the level of global institutions. It is 
through the agency of  different kinds of actors including governmental, non-governmental 
and multilateral organisations, regimes and regime complexes as well as global networks of 
different kinds that global governance is shaped.6 These institutions themselves emerge in 
relation to wider structural and discursive forms of power. To date, much attention has 
been focused on the changing role of multilateral organisations in relation to global 
governance including the World Bank (Bonal 2011; Klees, Samoff, and Stromquist 2012; 
Mundy and Verger 2015; Phillip W Jones 2007a; Philip W Jones 2006) and UNESCO 
(Coleman and Jones 2004). There is also an important literature on the role of global civil 
society in shaping  global education policy including EFA (Verger and Novelli 2012; Verger, 
Altinyelken, and Novelli 2012).  
 
There has been much more limited literature seeking to understand the global governance 
of education and development in terms of regime theory. In this regard EFA is commonly 
understood as a ‘global movement’ involving key institutions organized around a core set of 
principles encapsulated in key texts including the Jomtien Declaration, the Dakar Framework 
for Action as well as  the education MDGs (Mundy and Manion 2015).7 In keeping with 
existing scholarship, understanding EFA as a regime also involves understanding of the 
changing relationships between key institutions that have shaped EFA. As is widely 
documented, several multilateral organisations have been instrumental in shaping EFA from 
inception including the World Bank, UNESCO, UNICEF (where the EFA idea originated) and 
the UNDP. The early days of EFA in the lead up and aftermath of both the Jomtien 
conference in 1990 (at which the first declaration on Education for All was agreed) and the 
Dakar conference in 2000 (that adopted the EFA Framework for Action) were marked by 
infighting between these organisations with the World Bank ultimately proving dominant 
(King 2007a). Global NGOs including the influential Global Campaign for Education were also 
influential in advocating a more rights based vision of EFA (Mundy and Murphy 2001; 
Mundy and Manion 2015; Verger and Novelli 2012). EFA has also been shaped by the 
actions and demands of key donors, for example in the establishment and development of 
the Fast Track Initiative (FTI) as a means of channeling bilateral funding for education in 
support of EFA (Bermingham 2011; Bermingham 2010). In 2012 the FTI itself morphed into 
                                                     
economics or a view of human rights. In this view, however, discourses can in turn be deployed strategically in 
the production of policy by different epistemic communities representing a range of interests.   
6 The term ‘institution’ is used in an inclusive sense here to encompass not only regimes and regime complexes 
but to also refer to international organisations including multilateral organisations and NGOs that are a 
component of regime complexes. 
7 Whilst Mundy and Manion’s work provides a rich account of the emergence of the EFA within what they 
describe as the education and development regime, it does not draw out the implications of understanding 
the governance of education in terms of regime theory. 
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the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) with its own charter and governance structures. 
However, it is suggested below that the increasing prominence of the GPE as a major 
conduit for funding in the field of education and development along with the increasingly 
prominent role played by other institutions including the OECD can be seen as evidence for 
the emergence of a new regime at the heart of the field of education and development. 
 
T he article also makes use of the most well-known definition of regimes as ‘sets of implicit 
or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations’ (Krasner 1982 185; see also; 
Orsini, Morin, and Young 2013) as a way of re-interpreting EFA as a regime. Understanding 
EFA in this way, it is suggested, whilst providing something of a departure for existing 
scholarship, is useful for deeper and more systematic understanding of EFA both in its own 
terms and in relation to other regimes impacting on education and development. It also 
allows for a consideration of how EFA has changed over time. For our purposes, principles 
are factors which guide the purpose of action of governments and institutions. In the case of 
EFA they comprise the underlying view of education and development including the 
rationale for investment in education. Norms determine what general behaviour is 
legitimate in pursuing a particular regime’s goals. The rules are closely related to norms and 
particularise the actual rights and obligations of governments and institutions in a regime. In 
the case of EFA they include consideration of the specific funding mechanisms that have 
been used. Finally, decision-making procedures are also closely linked to norms and refer to 
the mechanisms within and between governments and institutions through which decisions 
are made8. Extending the original formulation somewhat, ‘decision-making procedures’ is 
also used here to capture the organizational form of the regime which impacts on decision 
making.  
 
For exponents of regime theory, a regime is primarily characterised by the principles and 
norms governing a regime. Despite some shifts in emphasis, the principles and norms 
governing EFA have remained fairly consistent over the past quarter of a century. It will be 
suggested that they have centred on a commitment to education as a human right and as an 
investment in human capital but that this has had contradictory implications for the way 
that EFA has been conceptualized, including the scope of EFA, the relative weight attached 
to issues of access versus quality, which groups EFA has been targeted at and the role of 
states and markets in the provision of education. They are rooted in turn in wider discourses 
of development from the Washington to the post-Washington consensus and more recently 
to sustainable development. As will be discussed in detail in the following sections, 
however, the more recent Incheon Declaration  and Framework for Action (IDFA) (UNESCO, 
n.d.) sets out a new set of principles that are inclusive of EFA principles but are more 
explicitly linked to a holistic and single vision of sustainable development: 
 
We commit with a sense of urgency to a single, renewed education agenda that is holistic, 
ambitious and aspirational, leaving no one behind. This new vision is fully captured by the 
proposed SDG 4 “Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote life-long 
learning opportunities for all” and its corresponding targets. It is transformative and 
                                                     
8 As has been pointed out, there are overlaps and it is not always easy to clearly distinguish between 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures (Haggard and Simmons 1987).  
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universal, attends to the ‘unfinished business’ of the EFA agenda and the education-related 
MDGs, and addresses global and national education challenges. It is inspired by a humanistic 
vision of education and development based on human rights and dignity; social justice; 
inclusion; protection; cultural, linguistic and ethnic diversity; and shared responsibility and 
accountability. We reaffirm that education is a public good, a fundamental human right and 
a basis for guaranteeing the realization of other rights. (UNESCO 2015b). 
 
The principles enshrined in the IDFA also explicitly acknowledge the importance of South-
South collaboration as a modality for realising development assistance, which can be seen 
as evidence of the growing influence of the Rising Powers9 including China in the 
development of global regimes including the SDGs. 
 
The norms associated with EFA are encapsulated in the various targets set out in key 
declarations and frameworks including the Jomtien Declaration, the Dakar Framework for 
Action and more recently the Muscat Agreement. These are summarised in the table below 
in relation to key topic areas within EFA. It is evident that there has been much continuity at 
the level of norms between Jomtien in 1990 and Muscat in 2015. It can also  be seen, 
however, that when it comes to the IDFA there has been a subtle shift at the level of norms 
with a greater emphasis in the IDFA compared to previous documents on attitudes, skills 
and dispositions linked to sustainable development (although these have been evident to 
some extent since Jomtien). We also see a greater emphasis over the period as a whole on 
secondary, vocational and higher education and on learning (as compared to access) with 
the exception of higher education where the emphasis in the IDFA lies in expanding access, 
including through scholarships.10 These changes in the level of norms are suggestive of 
regime change. 
 
There have been changes in the decision-making procedures over the years within the EFA 
regime linked to its changing organizational form. EFA originally evolved as a networked 
movement mobilized around a common set of principles and norms enshrined in the 
Jomtien Declaration and Dakar Framework for Action. At its centre was a secretariat and 
high level panel situated within UNESCO. Also significant, was the development of an 
epistemic community around the Global Monitoring Report (GMR) (recently transformed 
into the Global education Monitoring Report or GEMR) that draws on expertise from the 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics. The GMR was established after Dakar as a means of 
monitoring progress towards the EFA goals enshrined in the Dakar Framework of Action. 
This has provided a powerful source of advocacy for advancing the EFA agenda and an 
alternative locus for conceptualising education developments to the epistemic community 
associated with the World Bank (see below). The development of the EFA Fast Track 
Initiative in 2002 as a vertical fund within the World Bank with its own decision-making 
processes added another layer of organsational complexity but did not fundamentally alter 
its networked nature (Bermingham 2011). The development of the FTI into the GPE as the 
main institution for delivering EFA with its own Board of Directors in 2012 has, it will be 
                                                     
9 The rising powers is a category that includes the BRICS grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa, as well as regional powers such as Mexico and Indonesia. 
10 There is also a more explicit concern with the inclusion of different marginalized groups as well as the 
historical concern (since Dakar at least) with gender equity. The Dakar framework was unique in specifying a 
target relating to financial allocations although these are covered in other SDGs relating to global partnerships. 
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suggested below provided an alternative locus of power away from UNESCO. The FTI/ GPE 
has also been the central focus for rules within the regime, although these have had 
contradictory implications for donors on the one hand and for recipients of aid on the other. 
 
A change from one regime to another within a specific issue area is associated with a 
change in the underlying principles and norms that are associated with changes in the 
underlying development paradigm.  As Mundy and Manion explain, EFA emerged within the 
education and development issue area (Mundy and Manion 2015). Prior to EFA, education 
and development had been dominated by the funding modalities linked to World Bank 
structural adjustment lending and by forms of bilateral funding that had their origins in the 
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Table one: Jomtien, Dakar, Muscat and Incheon compared 
Topic area 
addressed 
1990-2000: 
Jomtien 
2000-2015: Dakar 2015-2030: 
Muscat 
2015-2030: 
Incheon  
Early childhood 
education 
1. Expansion of 
early childhood 
care and 
development 
activities, 
including family 
and community 
interventions, 
especially for poor, 
disadvantaged and 
disabled children.  
1. Expanding and 
improving 
comprehensive early 
childhood care and 
education, especially 
for the most vulnerable 
and disadvantaged 
children. 
1. By 2030, at 
least x% of girls 
and boys are 
ready for primary 
school through 
participation in 
quality early 
childhood care 
and education, 
including at least 
one year of free 
and compulsory 
pre-primary 
education, with 
particular 
attention to 
gender equality 
and the most 
marginalized.   
 
4.2 By 2030, ensure 
that all girls and 
boys have access to 
quality early 
childhood 
development, care 
and pre- primary 
education so that 
they are ready for 
primary education 
Access to basic, 
formal 
education 
2. Universal access 
to, and completion 
of, primary 
education (or 
whatever higher 
level of education 
is considered as 
“basic”) by the 
year 2000. 
2. Ensuring that by 
2015 all children, 
particularly girls, 
children in difficult 
circumstances and 
those belonging to 
ethnic minorities, have 
access to and complete 
free and compulsory 
primary education of 
good quality. 
2. By 2030, all 
girls and boys 
complete free and 
compulsory 
quality basic 
education of at 
least 9 years and 
achieve relevant 
learning 
outcomes, with 
particular 
attention to 
gender equality 
and the most 
marginalized.   
 
4.1 By 2030, ensure 
that all girls and 
boys complete free, 
equitable and 
quality primary and 
secondary 
education leading 
to relevant and 
effective learning 
outcomes 
Improving 
education 
quality and 
learning 
outcomes 
3. Improvement in 
learning 
achievement such 
that an agreed 
percentage of an 
appropriate age 
cohort (e.g. 80% 
14 year olds) 
attains or surpasses 
a defined level of 
necessary learning 
achievement. 
6. Improving all 
aspects of the quality 
of education and 
ensuring excellence of 
all so that recognized 
and measurable 
learning outcomes are 
achieved by all, 
especially in literacy, 
numeracy and essential 
life skills. 
Increasing  basic 
literacy/ 
numeracy 
 4. Reduction in 
the adult illiteracy 
rate (the 
appropriate age 
cohort to be 
determined in each 
country) to, say, 
one-half its 1990 
level by the year 
2000, with 
sufficient emphasis 
on female literacy 
to significantly 
reduce the current 
4. Achieving a 50 per 
cent improvement in 
levels of adult literacy 
by 2015, especially for 
women, and equitable 
access to basic and 
continuing education 
for all adults. 
3. By 2030, all 
youth and at least 
x% of adults reach 
a proficiency level 
in literacy and 
numeracy 
sufficient to fully 
participate in 
society, with 
particular 
attention to girls 
and women and 
4.6 By 2030, ensure 
that all youth and a 
substantial 
proportion of 
adults, both men 
and women, 
achieve literacy and 
numeracy 
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disparity between 
the male and 
female illiteracy 
rates. 
the most 
marginalized.   
 
 
 
Gender equity  5. Eliminating gender 
disparities in primary 
and secondary 
education by 2015, 
with a focus on 
ensuring girls’ full and 
equal access to and 
achievement in basic 
education of good 
quality. 
 4.5 By 2030, 
eliminate gender 
disparities in 
education and 
ensure equal access 
to all levels of 
education and 
vocational training 
for the vulnerable, 
including persons 
with disabilities, 
indigenous peoples 
and children in 
vulnerable 
situations 
 
Inclusion/ 
reaching the 
most 
marginalised 
   4.a Build and 
upgrade education 
facilities that are 
child, disability and 
gender sensitive 
and provide safe, 
non- violent, 
inclusive and 
effective learning 
environments for 
all  
Access to 
TVET/ HE 
 
5. Expansion of 
provision of basic 
education and 
training in other 
essential skills 
required by youth 
and adults, with 
programme 
effectiveness 
assessed in terms 
behavioral changes 
and impacts on 
health, 
employment and 
productivity. 
 4. By 2030, at 
least x% of youth 
and y% of adults 
have the 
knowledge and 
skills for decent 
work and life 
through technical 
and vocational, 
upper secondary 
and tertiary 
education and 
training, with 
particular 
attention to 
gender equality 
and the most 
marginalized.   
 
 
 
4.3 By 2030, ensure 
equal access for all 
women and men to 
affordable and 
quality technical, 
vocational and 
tertiary education, 
including university 
4.b By 2020, 
substantially 
expand globally the 
number of 
scholarships 
available to 
developing 
countries, in 
particular least 
developed 
countries, small 
island developing 
States and African 
countries, for 
enrolment in higher 
education, 
including 
vocational training 
and information 
and 
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communications 
technology, 
technical, 
engineering and 
scientific 
programmes, in 
developed countries 
and other 
developing 
countries 
Life skills/ 
sustainable 
development 
6. Increased 
acquisition by 
individuals and 
families of the 
knowledge, skills 
and values required 
for better living 
and sound and 
sustainable 
development, made 
available through 
all educational 
channels including 
the mass media, 
other forms of 
modern and 
traditional 
communication, 
and social action, 
with effectiveness 
assessed in terms 
of behavioural 
change. 
3. Ensuring that the 
learning needs of all 
young people and 
adults are met through 
equitable access to 
appropriate learning 
and life skills 
programmes. 
5. By 2030, all 
learners acquire 
knowledge, skills, 
values and 
attitudes to 
establish 
sustainable and 
peaceful societies, 
including through 
global citizenship 
education and 
education for 
sustainable 
development.   
 
 
 
4.4 By 2030, 
substantially 
increase the 
number of youth 
and adults who 
have relevant skills, 
including technical 
and vocational 
skills, for 
employment, 
decent jobs and 
entrepreneurship 
4.7 By 2030, ensure 
that all learners 
acquire the 
knowledge and 
skills needed to 
promote sustainable 
development, 
including, among 
others, through 
education for 
sustainable 
development and 
sustainable 
lifestyles, human 
rights, gender 
equality, promotion 
of a culture of 
peace and non-
violence, global 
citizenship and 
appreciation of 
cultural diversity 
and of culture’s 
contribution to 
sustainable 
development 
Teachers   6. By 2030, all 
governments 
ensure that all 
learners are taught 
by qualified, 
professionally-
trained, motivated 
and well-
supported 
teachers.   
 
4.c By 2030, 
substantially 
increase the supply 
of qualified 
teachers, including 
through 
international 
cooperation for 
teacher training in 
developing 
countries, 
especially least 
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developed countries 
and small island 
developing States 
Financial 
allocation 
  7. By 2030, all 
countries allocate 
at least 4-6% of 
their Gross 
Domestic Product 
(GDP) or at least 
15-20% of their 
public expenditure 
to education, 
prioritizing groups 
most in need; and 
strengthen 
financial 
cooperation for 
education, 
prioritizing 
countries most in 
need.   
 
 
Cold War period. These were so disparate it is difficult to describe them as a ‘regime’ and 
indeed it was partly as a response to the un-coordinated nature of development assistance 
within the area of education and development that EFA emerged. The emergence of a 
distinct regime organised around EFA is also associated with a wider shift from the 
Washington to the post-Washington consensus (see also Mundy 2007; Mundy and Manion 
2015). It will be suggested below that what we are currently witnessing is a further change 
in the underlying principles and norms governing the issue area linked to the wider shift 
towards a new sustainable development paradigm. A change from one regime to another 
can also be brought about, however, by the rise of a new hegemon, i.e. a new, dominant 
state or collection of nation states that challenge the principles and norms of existing 
regimes and/or introduce a new regime. In this respect, the emergence of a new regime can 
be considered in part at least as a response to the emergence of the Rising Powers, 
especially China and this is discussed further below.  
EFA as part of a regime complex 
As several commentators have observed global governance has become more ‘dense’ as the 
number of regimes impinging on different issue areas has increased (Orsini, Morin, and 
Young 2013). In this respect the number of regimes that have impinged on education and 
development has multiplied over time to the point where EFA can be said to exist within a 
‘regime complex’. Here a regime complex is defined as ‘a network of three or more 
international regimes that relate to a common subject matter; exhibit overlapping 
membership; and generate substantive, normative, or operative interactions recognised as 
potentially problematic whether or not they are managed effectively’ (Orsini, Morin, and 
Young 2013 29).11 The development of the EFA regime for example, has been strongly 
influenced by changes in the nature and scope of existing regimes that impinge on 
education and development. The interactions of these regimes have at different points been 
                                                     
11 The understanding of regime complex is informed by recent scholarship by Orisini et al (Orsini, Morin, 
and Young 2013).  
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found to be problematic by different actors as will be discussed. The advantage of 
conceiving of EFA as part of the regime complex, is that it allows for a consideration of the 
direction of influence of interrelated regimes based on an assessment of how different kinds 
of power operate in and through the regime complex.  
 
Diagram one below provides a schematic overview of the regime complex impinging on the 
education and development issue area. It is intended as a heuristic device for beginning to 
conceptualise the relationship between regimes impinging on education and development. 
The two-way arrows indicate the potential for reciprocal influences between regimes. The 
strength of the influence in either direction would need to be evaluated on the basis of 
empirical enquiry12 and is also likely to change over time. In the sections below, however, an 
initial discussion of the relationship between regimes is provided based on an evaluation of 
the existing evidence in the literature on EFA considered in relation to Barnett and Duvall’s 
typology of power. 
 
Diagram one: A schematic representation of EFA as part of a regime complex in the issue 
area of education and development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The development of EFA has been affected by changes in the wider aid regime within which 
EFA is nested. Space does not allow for a detailed analysis.13 The aid regime has been 
described elsewhere (Hook and Rumsey 2015; Barnett and Walker 2015). The key institution 
in this regime is the OECD and specifically the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
which has often determined the nature and direction of policy within the aid regime as a 
whole. Changes in policy such as the introduction of time bound targets heralded by the 
Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation report (Committee 
1996) were influential in the development of targets that informed the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) (Robertson et al. 2007; King 2007b). Similarly, the changing 
                                                     
12 This might involve, for instance, a undertaking discourse analysis of different protocols and treaties relating 
to different regimes to find evidence of the nature and direction of influence of one regime over another. 
13 Much of this rich history has been given elsewhere. See for example, (Philip W Jones 2006; Coleman and 
Jones 2004; Mundy 2007; King and Rose 2005; Mundy and Manion 2015) 
Aid regime 
Security regime 
MDGs/ SDGs 
Trade regime 
Human rights 
regime 
EFA 
International assessment regime 
The issue area of 
education and 
development. 
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discourse of aid effectiveness has provided a consistent theme in the development of EFA. 
For example, attempts were made to align the FTI from inception with the principles of aid 
effectiveness and donor harmonisation that were emerging from high-level donor meetings 
in Rome (OECD DAC 2003). Key documents associated with the FTI and now GPE reference 
the major conferences, protocols and agreements relating to aid effectiveness including the 
Paris declaration and the Busan agreement14 although as we will see, the broadening of the 
Busan aid effectiveness protocols to include concepts of South-South collaboration that 
encompass the Rising Powers has so far not been reflected in the governance of EFA or indeed 
the GPE. The OECD has also developed its own very powerful epistemic community that has 
exercised considerable productive power in the setting of global agendas. This includes the 
OECDs increasingly prominent role as a broker of education policy and linked to this the 
administration of the PISA international assessment regime. Most recently this has led to the 
development of the PISA for Development initiative15 as a means of drawing low income 
countries into the same framework of international assessments that is already inhabited by 
many high- and middle- income countries.  
 
The World Bank has also been a powerful institution in the context of the aid regime in its 
role as the major channel through which development assistance has been provided to low-
income countries in the form of loans and grants. The model of conditional lending has 
remained a consistent feature of World Bank lending in education as in other areas of 
development both in the context of the Washington and Post-Washington consensus (Bonal 
2011) although more recently World Bank lending for basic education for the poorest low-
income countries including those of sub-Saharan Africa has been superseded by the GPE 
with the Bank’s lending increasingly channeled towards supporting secondary and tertiary 
education in middle income countries (Mundy and Verger 2015). The strategy of drawing in 
a wider range of institutions and global networks in the development of the EFA agenda can 
be seen as part of a wider move to achieve legitimacy for its policies in the context of the 
Post-Washington consensus and following the success of the earlier Health for All initiative 
(Coleman and Jones 2004). The more recent establishment of vertical funds within the Bank 
as the preferred way to finance specific areas of health, education and other areas of 
development has been important for the way that the EFA regime has developed including 
the increasingly central role of the GPE (below). The World Bank has also evolved an 
extremely powerful epistemic community of its own that has played a significant role in 
shaping the principles and norms governing EFA (below). 
 
The development of the MDG and subsequently the SDG regimes under the auspices of the 
UN and also nested within the wider aid regime has had significant implications for the 
                                                     
14 The GPE summarises the principles relating to aid effectiveness on its website as i) Country ownership (the 
GPE provides support to its developing country partners to design, implement, and monitor education plans 
and partner governments provide adequate domestic financing for education and improve their country 
systems; Alignment (funding by the GPE and the donors is aligned to the public financial management and 
procurement systems of the partner country); Harmonization (the GPE encourages donors, multilateral 
organizations, and civil society organizations to coordinate their work, and ensure that external funding is 
harmonized among the donors and aligned to the country systems); Managing for results (the GPE partnership 
encourages partners to track progress of the education plan implementation); Mutual Accountability (the GPE 
ensures that 'mutual accountability' principles are applied and that all partners in a country's education sector 
are accountable for their actions) (see  
15 See http://www.oecd.org/pisa/aboutpisa/pisa-for-development-background.htm 
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development and future of EFA.16 The process that led to the drafting and adoption of the 
MDGs did not centrally include UNESCO as the lead organisation in EFA, although UNICEF 
were involved as were the World Bank. The implication was the adoption of a narrower 
agenda than that represented by the Dakar Framework to reflect the World Bank’s historic 
emphasis on primary education and UINICEF’s concern with girls’ education. The 
implications of this narrower agenda have often been perceived as problematic by those 
committed to EFA (Mundy and Manion 2015). The two MDGs relating to education were: 
 
MDG 2: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to 
complete a full course of primary schooling 
MDG 3: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, 
and in all levels of education no later than 2015 
 
The more recent Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were arrived at through a wider 
process of decision-making than was the case with the MDGs including the establishment of 
the Open Working Group following the Rio+20 summit on sustainable development, 
member state negotiations and a series of global consultations. The targets associated with 
SDG 4 were fully incorporated into the IDFA and are outlined in table one above.  
 
Of particular interest for our purposes was the effort on the UN’s part to achieve harmony 
between the IDFA on the one hand and the SDGs on the other. A key motive has been to 
avoid the same kind of differences in scope and focus between the IDFA and the SDGs as 
existed between the Dakar Framework and the education MDGs. Ensuring a common 
language between the IDFA and the education SDG demonstrates on the one hand the 
greater extent of inter-agency dialogue and co-ordination which can be seen as a response 
to a growing recognition by institutions themselves of the reality of regime complexity 
(Orsini, Morin, and Young 2013). It can also be seen as evidence of increasing efforts at 
inter-institutional co-ordination by a growing cadre of professionals linked to these 
institutions (Mundy and Manion 2015). It also serves, however, to underline the direction of 
power and influence within the regime complex. Just as the education targets within the 
MDGs proved more influential than those within EFA it was the wording of the education 
SDG rather than that of the Muscat agreement that had preceded Incheon (and developed 
under the auspices of EFA)  that is included in the declaration. Indeed,  the title of the IDFA 
takes a cue from the wording of the education SDG goal (above), i.e. Education 2013: 
Towards Inclusive and Equitable Quality Education and Lifelong Learning for All17.  
 
Since inception a key influence on EFA has been from the human rights regime. A consistent 
point of reference in the development of the principles of EFA have been the various UN 
conventions on human rights and especially on the rights of the child. These are also 
referenced quite clearly in the IDFA. The mandates for both UNESCO and UNICEF arise from 
their roles in advancing human rights in education and other spheres. The world trade 
regime has also provided an increasingly influential (if complex and contradictory) 
                                                     
16 Here the analysis departs from the traditional view of EFA as a movement. Rather than the education MDGs 
and the education SDG being seen as integral to EFA they are seen as belonging to separate albeit related 
regimes governed by different principles, norms, rules and decision-making processes. 
17 Thus although in diagram one above a double headed arrow is used to indicate a two-way influence, the net 
influence has been from the larger MDG/SDG regime complex to EFA. 
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regulatory framework including, for example, the General Agreement in Trade in Services 
(GATS), the more recent Trade in International Services Agreement (TiSA) and various 
Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) that are all aimed at liberalising cross-border trade in 
services including education. Careful analysis has shown (Verger 2009; Verger and 
Robertson 2012), the effect of these agreements is to create a regulatory and policy 
environment at national level that is conducive to the further privatization and 
marketization of education. The trade agreements have worked within the grain of the idea 
of public private partnerships that has been promoted by the World Bank in the context of 
the Washington and post-Washington consensuses. These effects are also contested by 
those working within a rights based framework and this has in turn affected the extent to 
which governments have included education as a service to be traded. The net effect, 
however, of these external and internal pressures for privatization has been to provide a 
supportive regulatory and policy environment for a growth in the number of private firms 
operating in low-income countries in the sphere of education including the establishment of 
chains of low fee private schools as well as privately run tertiary institutions. Connected to 
this broader shift in development thinking has been the growing influence of large 
philanthropic private sector organisations in their capacity as increasingly significant funders 
of education in global governance including, for example, on the board of the GPE. Finally, 
the global security regime has impacted on EFA through influencing efforts on the part of 
some donors to link funding for areas of development including education to the so-called 
‘war on terror’. This has effectively reduced the amount of aid money for education in some 
of the poorest regions of the world (Novelli 2010). More recently, the UN Secretary 
General’s own Global Education First Initiative has specifically linked the issue of access to a 
good quality education to  peace building including an emphasis on citizenship education18.  
 
As commentators have pointed out, regime complexity can have its own causal effects. For 
example, some regimes have the power to demand greater compliance over governments 
than others. In Barnett and Duvall’s terms that is to say that they exercise greater 
compulsory power. Trade agreements linked to the trade regime, for example, once signed 
often become binding on governments. The development aid regime on the other hand 
does not force governments to comply in the same way. Although donor governments are 
encouraged to commit a certain proportion of their GDP to aid, they are not compelled to 
do so unless they adopt their own legislation to this effect. Neither are governments 
compelled by legally binding agreements to commit funding to a specific area of 
international development or to comply with aid effectiveness principles. By way of contrast 
low-income countries are often compelled to accept the conditions attached to conditional 
loans from the World Bank or to comply with the rules for receiving aid from vertical funds 
channeled through the World Bank such as the funds managed by the FTI/ GPE.  
 
Regime complexity and the degree of compulsory power linked to different regimes allows 
donor governments latitude to link development assistance more closely to their own 
economic and political interests. For example, in the context of austerity politics in the wake 
of the 2008 financial crash, many governments can still choose to limit the amount of 
development assistance. They can also choose to channel aid to areas where there is 
                                                     
18 http://www.globaleducationfirst.org. The initiative also serves to underline the efforts by the Secretary 
General to highlight the important role of education within the overall aid regime. 
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greater evidence of value for money to appease internal critics of aid and to use aid 
strategically to support national security or, with respect to recent developments to seek to 
address the migration crisis facing European countries at source.  The United Kingdom, 
whilst protecting its overall aid budget, is a good example of a country that is using aid 
strategically to serve wider purposes and this has been made explicit recently by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer19. On the other hand, low-income countries are in a weaker 
position to make decisions that will potentially benefit their own economic and social 
development, reflecting their weaker position in relation to structural power within the 
global political economy. Given their structural position within the global economy, it is hard 
for them to resist the conditionalities associated with development assistance loans or 
grants from vertical funds such as the GPE. The great imbalance in compulsory power 
provides the basis for dependency and the major source of tension/contradiction within EFA 
and the aid regime more broadly as will be discussed below. 
 
At an institutional level, regime complexity can be said to have affected UNESCO’s power 
and influence as the leading institution within education and development, a point that is 
taken up below. The dominance of the MDG and SDG regimes over EFA reflects an 
increasing locus for policy-making away from UNESCO to other more powerful institutions 
within the broader aid regime. UNESCO is also faced with an increasingly competitive 
institutional environment within the EFA regime itself linked to regime complexity. In 
particular, the development of the GPE as the ‘preferred’ institution through which to fund 
the education SDG can be seen to reflect the growing shift towards vertical funding within 
the wider aid regime as well as the more central involvement of the private sector under the 
influence of powerful institutions including the WTO, the OECD and the World Bank. In this 
regard, as well as in relation to levels of overall funding that it receives, UNESCO can be 
seen, like the World Health Organisation in the global health regime and the UNHCR in the 
refugee regime as an increasingly ‘threatened institution’ (Betts 2013; Heyneman 2011). 
Nonetheless, it will be suggested, both UNESCO and the World Education Forum continue to 
play a crucial legitimatory role within the area of education and development. 
 
EFA as a global regime of governance: an analysis of key tensions 
The aim of this section is to identify key tensions in the principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures that have characterised EFA as a regime of global educational 
governance and to relate these to the discussion of power in the introductory section. 
Specifically, analysis has involved a re-reading of the existing literature on EFA to identify 
key tensions as they have previously been described in the literature and then re-
contextualising the discussion in relation to Barnett and Duvall’s typology of power. This has 
involved evaluating different kinds of evidence from the literature that show the effects of 
different forms of power including the existence of different causal mechanisms to explain 
how and why different kinds of power have served to shape issues and tensions.20  
                                                     
19 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/06/osborne-uk-aid-budget-national-interest-refugee-crisis-
syrians 
20 In relation to institutional and compulsory power, for instance, analysis has involved developing 
understanding the decision-making processes within the EFA regime and weighing up evidence for the 
dominance of different governments and international organizations to influence the actions of other actors. 
With regards to the more difficult to observe workings of structural and productive power, the emphasis was on 
seeking plausible explanations for the influence of these kinds of power. In the case of structural power this has 
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The principles underlying EFA 
As has been suggested, the principles underlying EFA have been largely shaped by the 
productive power associated with two major discourses (Tikly and Barrett 2011). The first 
sees education principally as an investment in human capital which can support economic 
growth. In the context of the post-Washington consensus an investment in human capital 
was also seen as a basis for poverty reduction.  More recently, the idea of human capital has 
been linked to a view of ‘sustainable’ and ‘inclusive’ growth (World Bank 2012). The other 
dominant discourse sees education as a basic human right and as a means for achieving 
further rights. It has increasingly been linked to a view of ‘sustainable human development’ 
that finds expression, for example in the IDFA and in the preamble to the SDGs. Each 
discourse has shaped and has in turn been developed by distinct but overlapping ‘epistemic 
communities’ clustered around the World Bank and around UNESCO and the Global 
Monitoring Report respectively21. As suggested earlier, EFA has also been influenced by 
discourses relating to aid effectiveness and to the role of international assessments in 
monitoring and evaluating learning that have been largely propagated by epistemic 
communities associated with the OECD. The section below discusses key tensions in the 
development of principles underlying EFA. It will be suggested in the next section that the 
causes of the tensions and the way that they have been resolved/ played out largely reflects 
changes in the balance of productive power.  
 
Firstly, there has historically been a tension between investment in different levels of 
education. Although, from the beginning, there was agreement that EFA should focus on a 
notion of ‘basic education’ and on ‘basic learning needs’ there were differences in the way 
that these were interpreted. UNESCO, building on earlier conceptualisations of community 
education, championed an expanded understanding of basic education to embrace early 
childhood education, primary education, basic secondary and vocational education as well 
as adult literacy. For the World Bank and UNICEF the focus was very much on primary 
education and it was this focus that became increasingly dominant throughout the EFA 
period, reflected, for example, in the MDGs. The view was supported by the development of 
rates of return analyses that provided a powerful rationale for investment in basic 
education. The view persisted despite the preferences of many low-income country 
governments, and arguments about the importance of post-primary education (King 2007a; 
Tikly 2003).  
 
More recently, there has been an assertion of a ‘systems approach’ on the part of the World 
Bank (and leading donors such as DfID) that has laid emphasis on basic skills in literacy and 
numeracy but also vocational skills and higher order skills for leveraging economic growth 
                                                     
involved relating the discussion to the understanding of global governance presented above whilst in the case of 
productive power this has involved considering the workings of distinctive epistemic communities. 
21 It is important to avoid reductionist view of epistemic communities in that members of both communities, 
despite different priorities and starting points may share overlapping views of basic principles, (e.g. a belief in 
human rights or the importance of education in elation to economic growth). Members of different communities 
might also share overlapping epistemological orientations, e.g. a commitment to empirical methodologies. It is 
also important to avoid a simplistic mapping of different epistemic communities onto agents in that members of 
different organisations may share similar overall commitments at the level of principle. Some agencies, e.g. 
some of the major donor agencies might also be influenced to lesser or greater degrees by different epistemic 
communities and different underlying views of education and development. 
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(World Bank 2011). To some extent the move towards a more expansive view of the 
importance of different levels of skill can be seen as a rapprochement between the World 
Bank and UNESCO’s long standing advocacy of lifelong learning and for an expanded notion 
of basic skills that finds expression both in the IDFA and in the education SDG. The emphasis 
on scholarships for HEIs in the education SDG can be seen as an example of this shift in 
emphasis. It can also be interpreted, however, as a response to the increasing institutional 
power of the Chinese in influencing the field of education and development in this case 
through their influence over the SDGs. The Chinese government has historically emphasised 
scholarships to Chinese HEIs as a means of developing necessary skills and exerting ‘soft 
power’ (the promotion of the positive virtues of Chinese culture, language and civilisation) 
over recipients of such aid (King 2013).22 There remains an unresolved tension, however, 
between the emphasis on basic skills of literacy and numeracy supported by a range of 
important initiatives targeted at the early years and funded by the GPE, USAID, DfID and 
other donors and the concern with secondary, vocational and tertiary level skills where 
funding and investment for donors remains much more limited.  
 
Secondly, there has been an historic tension between issues of access and quality. There has 
been a distinct shift both within the EFA regime from a concern with access to an expanded 
notion of ‘access plus learning’ with the emphasis increasingly on ‘learning’. The new 
emphasis on learning is reflected in the titles of the World Bank’s current education strategy 
Learning for All, (which is also the title for DfID’s education strategy at the time of writing). 
The shift is associated with a growing recognition on the part of leading economists 
associated with the World Bank of the contribution of the quality of education to economic 
growth over and above years spent in school. A continued tension between access and 
quality remains evident in the education SDG and by implication the IDFA. The large number 
of sub-goals within the education SDG will mean strategic decisions will need to be taken 
about whether to invest, for example, in school construction or in improving the quality and 
status of teachers with the former being historically easier and cheaper to achieve. The 
emphasis on quality and learning has also been focused particularly on early years and basic 
education with less attention paid to ‘quality’ at higher levels. Tensions between issues of 
access and quality are also played out in current debates about gender in education. Here, 
the focus has often been on issues of improving access of girls to school rather than with a 
concern with the processes of schooling including forms of discrimination, stereotyping and 
sexualised violence that continue to militate against improved outcomes for girls and 
women (Aikman and Unterhalter 2005). These issues of process relate to the quality of 
education. They find expression in debates that have their origin in human rights discourses 
including those around the ‘child friendly’ and/or the ‘girl friendly school’ (Tikly and Barrett 
2011). 
 
The above also draws attention to competing notions of what a good quality education 
means. For many economists working within a human capital framework the understanding 
of ‘quality’ is often conflated with performance in standardised tests. This explains in part 
the importance attached to the participation of low-income countries in international 
assessments such as PISA. There is also advocacy for a range of skills linked to the 
                                                     
22 Thus although the Chinese did not take part in Incheon, they did take part in the SDG process and it is the 
SDG targets that have taken precedence over earlier EFA ones including those outlined in the 2014 Muscat 
agreement which made no mention of scholarships. 
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development of the so-called ‘knowledge economy’ including entrepreneurial and problem-
solving skills. Those working predominantly within a rights based framework have also 
emphasised the achievement of basic literacy and numeracy skills23 which are seen as 
important for achieving sustainable livelihoods. Here, however, there is also an emphasis on 
a range of ‘skills for global citizenship’ including knowledge, attitudes, values and 
behaviours and the protection of linguistic and cultural rights that can support a rights 
based view of sustainable development. These kinds of skills have long been advocated 
within a rights based framework and specifically by UNESCO. Differing conceptions of the 
nature of education quality are linked, at an ontological level to alternative underlying 
assumptions about the nature of teaching and learning and of the mind itself (Tikly 2015).24  
 
There has also been a tension, between a recognition of the rights of different groups of 
marginalised learners and the narrower focus of the education MDGs on gender equality. 
Within human capital theory the emphasis on expanding the pool of skills to support growth 
leads to a concern to invest in basic skills for boys and girls and for learners from all socio-
economic backgrounds. There is also a concern to avoid the economic and social costs 
associated with youth unemployment (World Bank 2011). Within a rights based discourse 
on the other hand, the main focus is on realising the rights of the ‘most marginalised’ and 
this view finds expression in the Muscatt agreement and more recently in the education 
SDG25 and IDFA. This includes not only those from poor backgrounds and girls but also 
members of linguistic and cultural minorities, learners with disabilities, those affected by 
conflict etc.26 The changing emphasis on which groups to fund has had implications for 
which countries ought to be targeted by EFA. In this respect the FTI/ GPE and bilateral 
funding associated with EFA has not always targeted countries that contain large numbers 
of disadvantaged learners. This has included some low- income and post-conflict countries 
that have been unable to develop education sector plans (below) as well as middle income 
countries including those involved in conflict that despite being relatively prosperous 
contain significant numbers of disadvantaged young people. For example, the on-going 
crisis in Syria has led to an as yet unresolved debate within the GPE about its role in disaster 
management in these contexts (Winthrop and Steer 2015). 
 
Finally, there has been an historical tension about the role of states and markets in the 
provision of education and training. Within a human capital framework the promotion of 
‘choice’ in education through increasing the role of non-state actors in the provision of 
education is seen as the principle means for driving up the quality of provision of education 
with a limited role for the state in regulating provision. The World Bank’s last education 
                                                     
23 For example, performance in literacy and numeracy are measured by the Southern and East African 
Consortium on Monitoring Education Quality which is supported by the International Institute for Education 
Planning which is part of UNESCO. 
24 For example, the emphasis on the achievement of a narrower set of largely cognitive skills by economists 
resonate closely with behaviourist views of learning whilst rights based discourses have traditionally favoured 
learner-centred approaches based on constructivist and situated theories of learning. Each have different and 
sometimes contradictory implications at the level of policy and practice. 
25 The increasing emphasis on a more nuanced approach to meeting the needs of different kinds of 
marginalised groups is reflected in the SDGs through, for example, use of the term ‘most marginalised’. 
26 Evidence suggests, however, that this emphasis is yet to translate into practice in terms of noticeable 
improvements in access to a good quality education for many of the most marginalised groups (UNESCO 
2010). 
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strategy document (World Bank 2011) sets out a view of education systems as combining 
public and private provision and the private sector is increasingly funding chains of private 
schools with their own independent governance structures that fall outside of governance 
architecture both at a global and national level. Within a rights based framework, education 
is seen as principally a public good with the state playing a leading role in the provision of 
education. The tension is reflected in an increasingly vociferous debate about the role of 
private schools in the provision of basic education27.  
 
Norms governing EFA 
The significance of norms for a regime such as EFA are that they seek to shape the 
behaviour of actors including donors and recipients of aid. Of particular relevance here are 
the tensions associated with norms linked to the use of targets and discourses of aid 
effectiveness. Starting with targets, a key abiding tension has been between the targets and 
the capacity of different governments to meet those targets. Despite progress under the 
MDGs, success in meeting targets was partial and uneven (UNESCO 2015a). Given the larger 
number of targets associated with the education SDG it is likely that many governments will 
struggle to meet these without substantial increases in the budget for education and in their 
capacity to deliver on the targets (below). Part of the tension relates to the lack of financial 
resource available to low-income countries. The tension draws into sharp focus the position 
of low-income countries on the periphery of the global economy linked to disparities in 
structural power. It serves to highlight a fundamental contradiction within the wider aid 
regime between the focus on supporting social development through aid and the marginal 
position of low-income countries in relation to other regimes that directly impact on their 
position in the global economy including regimes governing trade and regulation of financial 
markets (Cohn 2015). That is to acknowledge the relative lack of influence that low-income 
countries have on determining the terms of trade in basic commodities and other exports 
and their vulnerability to financial shocks such as the 2008 global financial crisis. It also 
draws attention to the disparities in compulsory power between donor countries and 
recipient countries. As has been pointed out in relation to the education MDGs, the targets 
relating to the actions of low-income countries in realising the education SDG are time 
bound whilst those relating to the allocation of financial assistance by high income countries 
are not time bound (King and Rose 2005). 
 
Part of the tension also relates to questions of governance at a national level including the 
proportion of national budgets committed to education, the effectiveness of tax collection, 
the extent of corruption, the efficiency of the bureaucracy etc. In terms of the analysis of 
power, it draws attention to the inability of compulsory power wielded by Ministries of 
Education and donors within the context of the EFA regime to influence these wider issues 
of governance beyond whatever influence they can have over capacity within the education 
sector itself, for example in relation to the development of education sector development 
plans (below). It also draws attention to the lack of vested interests that indigenous elites 
may have in state education systems given that their own children are likely to attend 
                                                     
27 See for example the sometimes acrimonious debate on the United Kingdom Forum for Education and 
Training website http://www.ukfiet.org/2015/what-we-know-and-dont-know-about-the-impact-of-private-
schooling-in-developing-countries/ 
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prestigious private schools and the lack of institutional power held by actors within civil 
society to hold national governments to account.28  
 
A further tension relates to differences between EFA targets and national development 
priorities. A study of the Rwandan education sector for example (Hayman 2007) has pointed 
to the real tensions between investing in basic education to fulfil the MDGs and in other 
sectors of education including higher education to realise other national development 
priorities (see also Tikly and Tikly 2003). This speaks to the effects of compulsory power on 
national governments. Of relevance here is the dependency that has been associated with 
EFA funding such that in many low income countries development assistance makes up a 
very large proportion of the overall education budget (King 2009). This dependency 
reinforces the compulsory power of donors over recipients, provides constraints on the 
capacity of local leadership to determine priorities and raises questions about the long term 
sustainability of EFA.  
 
There are also tensions related to aid effectiveness. Central to contemporary discourses 
about aid effectiveness is the increasing emphasis on ‘results based aid’. However, it is often 
very difficult to measure the returns on aid to an issue area such as education and 
development, particularly with the focus on improvements in learning. This is because of 
the difficulties of scaling up innovations; the sometimes considerable length of time it can 
take for interventions to achieve measurable improvements in learning outcomes; as well as 
difficulties in attributing causality for improved outcomes to increases in aid, especially in 
the context where the majority of aid is in the form of sector wide support. Furthermore, 
the discourse of aid effectiveness is usually targeted at recipients of aid. In this sense 
‘accountability’ is usually one way. There are no sanctions that low-income governments 
can use to ensure consistency in funding priorities on the part of donors for instance or to 
ensure donor harmonisation. At a structural level the Busan agreement and those preceding 
it including the Accra framework and Paris declaration are presented in terms of a 
consensus amongst donor and recipient countries around underling norms governing aid. 
There is a tension, however, in that whereas the Busan agreement included most low-
income countries and the BRICS economies, these emerging donors increasingly pursue 
their own agendas in the education and development issue area, posing a threat to notions 
of donor harmonization (Mundy and Verger 2015).29 Finally, there is a tension between the 
concept of aid effectiveness and the way that EFA has up until now been implemented. For 
example, it has been suggested, that the principle of ‘ownership’ is compromised by the 
limited choice that low-income national governments have in accepting the conditionalites 
that go along with aid.  
                                                     
28 Here initiatives such as Pratham in India and Uwezo in East Africa are designed specifically to improve levels 
of accountability of national governments to civil society through publishing externally collected performance 
data relating to basic literacy and numeracy can play an important role in seeking to make national 
governments more accountable. The difficulty here is that they do not necessarily develop capacity within 
government to effectively monitor and act on their own performance data (below). 
29 In the case of China, much of China’s aid is in the form of support for higher education. Other forms of 
support including, for example, building schools and infrastructure is often not easy to characterise as traditional 
‘aid’ in the way that the OECD would for instance. 
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Rules governing EFA 
It will be recalled that the rules governing EFA relate to the rights and obligations of donors 
and recipient countries. Rules are closely tied to and arise from norms. In the case of EFA 
these relate principally to the rules governing funding. The experience of the FTI/ GPE 
highlights two key tensions with respect to funding rules30. A major historical tension has 
been in securing consistently adequate allocations from donors both under FTI and now 
GPE. As suggested above, this relates in part to the difficulties of exercising compulsory 
power over donor countries to ensure compliance with global targets. This has not yet 
translated into sustained and consistent increases in allocations with very large yearly 
fluctuation in the amounts allocated31. This tension has persisted despite efforts to improve 
the efficiency and transparency of funding and to make the GPE fund more visible and 
attractive to a wider range of donors. Recently, overall education aid allocation has fallen by 
nearly 10 percent, and education aid to countries in sub-Saharan Africa has fallen by 21 
percent (Winthrop and Steer 2015). Further, GPE has found it challenging to resist reduced 
donor support for education, and to overcome gaps created by those who have left the 
sector, like the Netherlands.  Additionally, GPE’s fund is still small.  Its first replenishment in 
2011 included pledges from 60 organizations and a total of only $1.5 billion to the GPE fund 
over the 2011-2014 period—an amount that is a far cry from addressing the global financing 
gap that UNESCO estimates exists of $26 billion annually.  Fluctuations in allocation have led 
to fluctuations in disbursement. This in turn has led to inconsistency in the levels of support 
available for education budgets year on year which in highly aid dependent countries has 
affected the capability to realise the goals set out in education plans. 
 
The GPE fund also compares very unfavorably with the amounts committed to similar funds 
targeting other areas of social development. For example, the Global Fund for AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria raised $12 billion from 25 countries, the European Commission, 
foundations, corporations and faith-based organizations for the 2014-2016 period, a 30 
percent increase over the pledges of $9.2 billion secured for 2011-2013 (Winthrop and Steer 
2015). Part of this relates to productive power and the relative ability of epistemic 
communities associated with the education and development issue area compared to other 
issue areas such as health to produce the kind of evidence that can convince donor 
governments to invest in education in a context where governments must convince their 
own political constitutencies of the value for money of investing in one area of development 
as compared to another32.  
 
A further historical tension relates to the linking of funding to the ability of governments to 
produce a credible education sector development plan. For some low-income countries 
including those emerging from conflict, developing such a plan has historically proved 
                                                     
30 EFA has been funded through a mix of multilateral and bilateral funding although it is the multilateral 
funding that has become most significant. 
31 For example, according to Winthrop and Steer (Winthrop and Steer 2015) allocations varied between 
$153 million in 2011 to $490 million in 2012, rising to $1031 million in 2013 only to drop to $462 million in 
2014.  
32 As has been argued elsewhere this is partly because the outcomes from an investment in the prevention of 
communicable diseases are arguably more immediate and easier to quantify than the outcomes of something 
as complex and multicausal as learning (Tikly 2015). 
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challenging. The number and complexity of the education SDGs is likely to exacerbate rather 
than to simplify difficulties in writing sector development plans. The catalytic fund under the 
FTI was set up partly to address this tension and the GPE supports capacity development to 
produce education sector plans in fragile and post-conflict states and other low-income 
countries through its education sector plan and programme development grants. However, 
despite these efforts and those of other donors to support capacity development there 
often remains a dependency on external technical expertise in developing plans that 
potentially compromises norms relating to ‘ownership’ (above). Linked to this is the issue of 
matching sector development plans to changing national and donor priorities and the 
question of long term consistency in donor funding. Finally, there is often limited capacity 
for organisations within civil society to influence sector development plans (Education, n.d.). 
The above points relate to the challenges faced by national governments and civil society 
organisations to harness productive power to define indigenous rather than global interests 
and priorities.  
 
Decision-making in EFA 
The genealogy of EFA has been marked by tensions between the key institutions within EFA 
over decision-making reflecting differences in institutional power. For example, both 
Jomtien and Dakar were characterised by infighting between the key multilateral 
organisations with the World Bank dominating (King 2007b; Coleman and Jones 2004). More 
recently, however, the influence of the World Bank appears to have waned linked to a 
reduction in funding for basic education in low-income countries on the part of the World 
Bank (Mundy and Verger 2015). It was suggested in previous sections that the governance 
of EFA has been affected by regime complexity including the increasing ‘density’ of 
institutions and regimes influencing the education and development issue area. This has had 
the effect, it will be recalled of increasing the scope for gaming on the part of donor 
governments which impacts on allocations to EFA but also of creating competition for 
UNESCO as the locus for decision-making within the EFA regime and the wider regime 
complex.  
 
What is emerging is a new decision-making architecture. Following Bermingham 
(Bermingham 2010; Bermingham 2011), the new architecture can still be described as 
‘networked’ and diffuse although there has been an attempt to create greater coherence 
through the closer alignment of the IDFA  with the SDGs. Within the new architecture the 
WEF continues to play an important legitimatory role in terms of the education and 
development issue area through providing a platform for multiple actors to potentially have 
a voice in global governance. The shift from the FTI to the GPE in 2012 can also be seen as 
an attempt at improving the legitimacy as well as the effectiveness of this funding 
mechanisms through providing a more inclusive and transparent governance structure. 
These shifts can be perceived as an attempt to reduce the ‘democratic deficit’ facing EFA 
and global governance more broadly. Significantly, the trajectory of the past decade has 
been towards a greater influence for the FTI/GPE and the MDGs/SDGs at the level of 
principles and norms as we have seen. Despite the realignment, tensions that have 
historically characterised EFA are likely to persist albeit in new forms. 
 
An example is the dominance of international agencies over the voices of civil society in 
decision-making processes. Despite the achievements of organisations such as the Global 
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Campaign for Education and leading NGOs in challenging the hegemony of the multilateral 
organisations 33 it is the perspectives of dominant global institutions and especially the 
World Bank that have historically been more powerful in shaping the EFA agenda including 
the Jomtien Declaration and the Dakar Framework of action (King 2007b; Torres 2001; 
Mundy and Murphy 2001). Similarly, it is the global institutions that have dominated the 
formulation of the education SDG and the IDFA through their leadership and co-ordination 
roles. This is reflected for example, in the decision to use the SDG 4 as the basis for the IDFA 
which was taken behind closed doors and outside of the WEF.34 
 
A further set of tensions relates to the opening up of the policy space represented by the 
GPE to a new set of donors including private philanthropic organisations such as the Open 
Societies Institute and the Hewlett and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Philanthropic 
organisations are represented on the Board of the GPE. On the one hand these Foundations 
share similar goals to traditional actors working in the area and provide valuable additional 
resources and new ideas including an emphasis on social innovation. In some cases, such as 
the OSI, they provide a radical space for critically evaluating developments in education and 
in global governance itself35. On the other hand, there is a tension between the increasingly 
prominent role of private foundations and the view expressed in the IDFA of education as 
fundamentally a public good.  The tension is especially pronounced in relation to the 
growing number of chains of low fee private schools operated by international private 
companies such as Pearsons. These chains have their own diffuse governance structures and 
operate outside of the EFA regime. In terms of the analysis of power, the increasing 
influence of the private sector on EFA reflects the structural power of sections of private, 
largely Western-based capital and the increasing institutional power that private capital has 
achieved within the regime complex. 
 
Finally, there have also been tensions around the donor-led nature of EFA since its inception 
(King 2007b; Torres 2001; Mundy and Murphy 2001; Mundy and Manion 2014). This has 
been reflected in the dominance in key decision-making fora of Northern-based 
representatives of international agencies and donors. Decision-making processes between 
NGOs have also been characterised as Northern-led, for example in the lead up to the Dakar 
Forum (Mundy and Murphy 2001). There has been growing recognition of the threat to the 
legitimacy of the EFA regime posed by the dominance of Northern-based organisations and 
interests within the EFA regime. This is reflected, for example in the findings of the mid-
term review of the FTI (Bermingham 2010; Bermingham 2011). As a result of the review 
                                                     
33 For example, the International Consultation of NGOs that preceded Dakar and was at least partially 
successful in achieving some of its goals including advocating for the concept of ‘free’ basic education. 
Similarly, the Global Campaign for Education played a leading advocacy role in the establishment of the FTI. 
The Make Poverty History Campaign and the concerted civil society campaigns around the G8 summit at 
Gleneagles in 2005 were also influential in re-invigorating donor commitments to the FTI. Most recently, civil 
society organisations were successful in ensuring a key aspect of IDFA, namely that Education is fundamentally 
a public good although this is an increasing source of tension within EFA.  
34 See the recent edition of NORRAG news in which the events leading up to and including the adoption of the 
Incheon declaration are discussed (available at: https://norrag.wordpress.com/2015/08/12/norrag-news-52-
reflections-on-the-world-education-forum-financing-education-and-skills/) 
35 See, for example, the privatisation in education research initiative funded by the OSI 
(http://www.periglobal.org) that provides a powerful critique of privatisation in education and especially of 
the increasing reliance on low cost private schools. 
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there has been an attempt to change the governance structure of the GPE with the board 
now made up of different donor, philanthropic and low income country constituencies. It 
has been argued, however, that given the nature of the compulsory and institutional power 
of Western donors within the regime, these moves towards greater legitimacy are unlikely 
to profoundly effect the Northern-led nature of the issue area. Where it may be possible to 
witness changes in the future is as a result of the growing influence of the Rising Powers. 
 
Conclusion: Towards a New Regime of Global Educational Governance? 
In the above sections an attempt has been made to describe the genealogy of the EFA 
regime focusing on key issues and tensions. Although EFA has been partial in its success in 
achieving its targets and realising its principles, it has proved resilient in the face of changing 
dynamics of global governance and increasing regime complexity. Nonetheless, it has been 
argued in the course of the article that what we are currently witnessing is a process of 
regime change. The new regime it is suggested is best described in terms of Learning for All 
or Education for Sustainable Development. The table below seeks to compare and contrast 
EFA with what went before it and with the emerging elements of a new regime. 
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Table two: Changing regimes of global governance in the education and development 
issue area 
  Pre-EFA (no 
regime) 
Education for All Education for 
Sustainable 
Development 
Principles Development 
paradigm 
Washington 
consensus 
Post-Washington 
consensus 
Sustainable 
development 
Dominant 
discourses 
Education for 
economic growth 
Education for 
poverty reduction 
and economic 
growth 
Education for 
sustainable 
economic growth 
Education as a 
human right 
Rights to in and 
through education 
Education for 
sustainable human 
development 
Scope Basic education Expanded basic 
education 
Lifelong education  
Focus Access Access Access plus 
learning 
Target All learners  All learners/ girls Marginalised 
groups/ girls 
States versus 
markets 
Markets States and markets States and markets 
Norms Approach to aid 
effectiveness 
n/a Paris declaration  Busan agreement  
Goals/ targets n/a EFA targets/ 
education MDGs 
SDG four  
Rules Donors No binding rules No binding rules No binding rules 
Recipients Credible Poverty 
Reduction Strategy 
Programmes 
Credible education 
sector development 
plans 
Credible education 
sector development 
plans 
Decision-making Organisational 
form 
Centralised Networked Networked 
Donor-/ recipient-
led 
Donor-led Donor-led Donor-led 
IO-led/ NGO-led IO-led IO-led/ NGO input IO-led/ NGO input 
Western-/ Rising 
power-led 
Western-led Western-led Western-led/ 
Increasing Rising 
Power influence 
 
 
It can be seen that although the new emerging regime provides continuity on EFA there are 
changes at the levels of principles and norms. Following Krasner’s original formulation 
(Krasner 1982)a, it is changes at the level of principles and norms that are most significant in 
terms of signaling regime change. These include an emphasis on sustainable development 
and on lifelong education as well as a shift to a more overt focus on access plus learning. 
The more expansive SDG four has replaced the EFA targets (although the goal itself 
incorporates previous EFA targets) and the IDFA acknowledges South-South collaboration as 
an aid modality reflecting the influence of the Busan agreement on aid effectiveness and of 
the Rising Powers. The nature of the rules governing the regime have changed very little. 
Decision-making within the regime continues to be networked and diffuse although there 
has been a shift of power within the regime away from UNESCO and towards the GPE. There 
is also evidence of increasing influence for the private sector (e.g. in the governance of the 
GPE) and of the Rising Powers through their influence over the SDG's. 
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It has also been suggested in the sections above that regime change can be seen as a 
response to ongoing tensions in the issue area of education and development and as a 
means to secure the legitimacy of global governance. Linking the principles and norms 
governing education and development to an overarching view of sustainable development 
that enjoys the support of all of the major institutions and the epistemic communities that 
support them; ensuring compatibility between the norms governing education and 
development and SDG four; and, seeking to normalise forms of South-South collaboration 
and introducing targets that reflect the priorities of the Rising Powers in development 
cooperation. Nonetheless, the emerging regime continues to be characterised by many of 
the tensions that have beset the EFA regime historically. 
 
There continues to be a tension between the economistic human capital theory that 
underpins the World Bank's view of how education can contribute to sustainable 
development and the more expansive, rights-based view developed over the years by 
UNESCO. At present, the GPE is focused on a narrower set of priorities in terms of funding 
than is suggested by SDG four or the IDFA. This narrow set of priorities remains more 
consistent with a human capital approach as it has developed historically with a focus on 
the development of measurable cognitive skills particularly in the early years. It is unclear as 
to whether these existing priorities will be expanded to encompass higher levels of 
education and training and a range of affective as well as cognitive skills or, whether the 
implementation of this expanded agenda will remain fragmented with China investing in 
higher education, philanthropic organisations, UNESCO and NGOs investing in other skills 
linked to sustainable development. A major ongoing source of tension is likely to remain 
around the respective roles of states and markets. In this regard and on the basis of existing 
evidence, it would appear that the private sector will continue to exert ever-increasing 
influence both at the level of provision and the level of governance. On-going debates are 
likely to focus on the changing role of the state as a provider of education, in providing a 
regulatory framework governing private operators and as a locus for linking up the 
education regime with other regimes in the context of nationally determined development 
paths .  
 
At the level of norms there remains a fundamental contradiction between the targets 
enshrined in the IDFA and the ability of governments to meet these given falling levels of 
aid, the lack of binding targets on donors and the continued marginal position of low-
income countries in relation to the global economy which makes it very difficult for them to 
fund areas of social development such as education on a sustainable basis. In this context it 
may be that the approach adopted by the Chinese of linking aid overtly to trade through 
mutually binding agreements, may become increasingly attractive to low-income countries 
as they pursue their own state-led development trajectories with implications for the 
emerging regime. It has also been argued, however, that the issue area including the norms 
and principles that govern it, have historically been contested. For those within global civil 
society or who are operating within key institutions that continue to aspire towards a more 
expansive view of education and sustainable human development this poses particular 
challenges. On the one hand it requires being clear about the nature of the tensions and 
contradictions affecting the issue area and on the other to identify strategic opportunities to 
advance this more holistic view, for example through ensuring that this is reflected in the 
areas of education and development targeted by the GPE. 
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